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As the global economy gradually recovers from the severe recession, the possible risks of unsustainable 
global imbalances are receiving renewed attention. In assessing global imbalances, it is important to 
avoid excessively focusing on current account imbalances per se. Rather, the focus should be on the root 
causes of the imbalance and whether they may become sources of unsustainable ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis, as well as Japan’s past experience in the 1980s, highlight the importance of 
information which cannot necessarily be obtained from current account statistics. Unsustainable ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances can be better captured through information such as the build-up of leverage, gross cross-border 
capital ﬂ  ows, risk pricing in ﬁ  nancial markets, and the extent of currency and maturity mismatches in 
the ﬁ  nancial system. Through careful assessment of such elements central banks and other authorities 
will be able to assess whether current account imbalances are a reﬂ  ection of the build-up of domestic 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
In formulating macroeconomic policy, the traditional emphasis was to ensure domestic stability or to put 
one’s house in order. However, with the deepening of globalisation, the simple sum of each country’s 
policy action may not necessarily achieve an optimal outcome at the global level. It has become ever 
more important for countries to review the spillover effects of their policies which will also reverberate 
back to each country through economic and ﬁ  nancial interlinkages.
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T
he debate surrounding global imbalances 
gained increasing attention after the turn 
of the century as the United States’ current 
account deﬁ  cit ballooned, while the current account 
surplus of some emerging market countries, notably 
China, increased dramatically. Some have argued 
that global imbalances were one of the key causes 
of the recent credit bubble in the United States and 
hence the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. Thus, as the world 
economy recovers from the severe recession, the 
possible expansion of global imbalances is receiving 
renewed attention. If global imbalances were to 
become unsustainable, it could derail the nascent 
global economic recovery. Against this background, 
the G20 Leaders have made “external sustainability” 
a key item on the G20 agenda for 2011. 
The global imbalance debate contains a host of issues. 
How much emphasis should be put on adjusting 
current account imbalances per se? What are the 
causes of current account imbalances? Does the fact 
that the largest deﬁ  cit country provides the key 
reserve currency delay the adjustment process, 
as the incentive to reduce deﬁ  cits is weaker? How 
much does the fact that some current account surplus 
countries have ﬁ  xed or relatively inﬂ  exible exchange 
rate systems inﬂ  uence current account imbalances? 
The introduction of new reserve assets would likely 
reduce the demand for US dollars, but would it reduce 
the precautionary demand for reserves, thereby 
reducing current account imbalances? These issues 
are closely linked to the broader discussions on the 
international monetary system and remind us of the 
original Bretton Woods debate between White and 
Keynes almost 70 years ago.
Among the various topics, this paper will focus 
on the appropriateness of using current account 
surpluses and deﬁ  cits as an indicator for assessing 
the sustainability of global imbalances. In the ﬁ  rst 
section, I will review Japan’s own experience, 
especially during the 1980s when current account 
surpluses increased signiﬁ  cantly and the country 
struggled to deal with external pressures to reduce 
current account surpluses, and in the second section 
look at experiences from the current global crisis. 
The third section will draw some lessons from the 
past and present. The fourth section will consider 
issues which need to be taken into consideration 
as we work to avoid the next global crisis, and the 
ﬁ  fth and ﬁ  nal section identiﬁ  es some challenges for 
policymakers.
1| T HE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
Looking back at the developments of Japan’s current 
account balance over the last ﬁ  fty years, with the 
rapid improvement in the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector, Japan began to continuously 
record trade surpluses and as a result current account 
surpluses starting from the mid-1960s (Chart 1). 
The only exceptions were the periods 1973-1975 and 
1979-1980, when surging oil prices due to the ﬁ  rst 
and second oil crises led to a fall in the trade surplus.
Entering the 1980s, Japan’s trade and current account 
surplus increased sharply and this was accompanied 
by increased external pressure, both bilaterally and 
multilaterally, to reduce Japan’s surplus. In the ﬁ  rst 
half of the 1980s, the focus was on constraining exports 
in speciﬁ  c sectors such as the voluntary restraints on 
automobile exports to the United States, and on “the 
opening up of Japan’s domestic markets” to overseas 
products and services. With regard to liberalisation of 
ﬁ  nancial markets, Japan’s Ministry of Finance and 
the US Treasury set up the “Yen-Dollar Committee” 
in November 1983. The Committee released its 
report in May 1984, which provided a detailed plan to 
liberalise Japan’s ﬁ  nancial and capital markets and to 
internationalise the yen. Meanwhile, the yen which had 
brieﬂ  y reached 177 yen to the dollar in the late 1970s, 
generally moved in the range of 200 to 250 yen to 
the dollar during the ﬁ  rst half of the 1980s, and the 
view that the yen should strengthen to reduce Japan’s 
trade and current account surplus mounted among 
Chart 1
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its major trading partners. In September 1985, the G5 
Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors 
announced in the “Plaza Accord”1 that “there are large 
imbalances in external positions which pose potential 
problems” and “agreed that exchange rates should play 
a role in adjusting external imbalances”. As is well 
acknowledged, based on this agreement the G5 began 
to intervene jointly in the foreign exchange markets to 
bring down the value of the dollar. The ﬁ  ve countries 
also made individual commitments as a part of 
the Plaza Accord, and Japan, among various measures, 
committed to “further opening up of Japan’s domestic 
market to foreign goods and services” and noted that 
“efforts to stimulate demand will focus on increasing 
consumption and investment through measures to 
enlarge consumer and mortgage credit markets”. In the 
area of monetary policy, Japan agreed to “ﬂ  exible 
management of monetary policy with due attention to 
the yen rate”. As a result of this agreement and ensuing 
intervention, the yen which had been around 240 yen to 
the dollar before the Plaza Accord appreciated sharply 
and touched 152 yen to the dollar in September 1986. 
The ratio-to-GDP of Japan’s current account surplus 
peaked at 4.2% in 1986 and began to decline thereafter.2 
However, Japan’s trade surplus with its major trading 
partners remained at high levels, and the view 
gradually took hold that exchange rate adjustments 
alone cannot signiﬁ  cantly reduce trade imbalances. 
External pressure on Japan to reduce its surplus began 
to focus more on the expansion of domestic demand. 
In February 1987, at a meeting in Paris, the G6 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors released the 
“Louvre Accord”. 3 The Ministers and Governors “agreed 
that the substantial exchange rate changes since the 
Plaza Agreement will increasingly contribute to 
reducing external imbalances and have now brought 
their currencies within ranges broadly consistent 
with underlying economic fundamentals” and they 
also “agreed to cooperate closely to foster stability of 
exchange rates around current levels”. The Ministers 
and Governors also recognised “that the large trade and 
current account imbalances of some countries pose 
serious economic and political risks”. Each member 
once again made speciﬁ  c commitments and Japan 
agreed to “follow monetary and fiscal policies 
which will help to expand domestic demand and 
thereby contribute to reducing the external surplus”. 
Additionally, the Bank of Japan “announced that it will 
reduce its discount rate by one half percent” to 2.5%.
Although the Japanese economy grew rapidly at 
an annual pace of 4.7% between 1986 and 1988, 
and asset prices showed double digit increases, the 
very low policy rate of 2.5% was maintained for 
over two years until May 1989, as inﬂ  ation rates 
remained stable at low levels.4 This period of a very 
low policy rate was much longer than in Germany 
which maintained its policy rate at 2.5% for less 
than a year.5 In spite of repeated intervention by 
the major countries following the Louvre Accord, 
the yen continued to strengthen against the dollar 
reaching 121 yen to the dollar in November 1988, 
raising concerns about a slowdown in the domestic 
economy, mainly in the export-related sectors. In the 
meantime, bilateral pressure from the United States 
continued. The US Congress passed an omnibus 
trade bill6 in 1988 and the following year Japan 
was identiﬁ  ed by the US government as one of the 
countries conducting unfair trade practices.7 In 1989, 
the Structural Impediments Initiative began between 
the US and Japanese governments. A joint report was 
ﬁ  nalised in June 1990 and the Japanese government 
committed to instituting a public investment program 
totaling as much as JPY 430 trillion (roughly 100% 
of nominal GDP) over a ten year period.8 Japan’s 
current account surplus dropped to 1.4% of GDP 
in 1990, but as the bubble burst and economic growth 
slowed, the ratio of current account surplus to GDP 
rose once again and averaged 2.4% during the 1990s. 
More recently Japan’s current surplus has averaged 
3.3% of GDP since 2000. However, its composition 
has changed significantly. In the past, Japan’s 
current account surplus was generally a reﬂ  ection 
of its trade surplus (Chart 2). But during this decade, 
the share of the trade surplus has declined and in 
1  “Announcement of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States” (September 22, 1985).
2  Due in part to the initial J-curve effect, there was a time lag before the surplus began to actually decrease.
3  “Statement of the G6 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” (February 22, 1987).
4  The average year-on-year change in CPI between 1986 and 1988 was 0.5%.
5  The Bundesbank reduced its discount rate from 3.0% to 2.5% in December 1987 and raised it again to 3.0% in July 1988. By the time the Bank of Japan raised 
its discount rate to 3.25% in May 1989, the policy rate in Germany was 4.5%.
6  “Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988”.
7  Brazil and India were also designated.
8  According to the report (Japan Structural Impediments Initiatives Joint Report), public investment during the previous decade (Fiscal 1981 to 1990) was estimated 
at JPY 263 trillion.
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recent years three-quarters of the current account 
surplus is taken up by the income account surplus. 
The large income account surplus is to a large extent 
predetermined by Japan’s accumulation of external 
assets over the years through portfolio and direct 
investments. 
What does the Japanese experience tell us?
First, how effective were exchange rate adjustments 
and other macroeconomic policies in reducing 
current account imbalances? They surely helped 
in bringing about a reduction in the trade surplus 
as part of cyclical dynamics, and thus a decrease of 
the current account surplus. However, aside from 
cyclical components, underlying current account 
trends were little changed. The attempt to make 
further adjustments through macroeconomic policies, 
especially through prolonged accommodative ﬁ  scal 
and monetary policy was unsuccessful. It rather had 
the detrimental side-effect of being one of the factors 
that fueled the expansion of the bubble and hence 
led afterwards to the serious predicament.
 
Incidentally, depending on the structure of the 
current account balance, surpluses and deﬁ  cits 
can be to a large extent predetermined. In Japan’s 
case, as mentioned above, the large income account 
surplus has driven the current account surplus in 
recent years. When we look across the G20 countries, 
this is not an isolated case. Australia’s current 
account deﬁ  cit can to a large extent be explained 
by its income account deﬁ  cit. The trade balance 
does have a large share of the current account in 
many countries, but other components such as 
the income account often have non-negligible and 
sometimes signiﬁ  cant impact on the overall picture 
of the current account balance (Chart 3). This is a 
reﬂ  ection of the structure of their economies and 
needs to be well understood when assessing the 
evolution of the current account. 
Chart 2
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Note: All ﬁ  gures are simple averages. Data for 2009 are estimates.
Sources: IMF, “World Economic Outlook”; CEIC.
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Second, was the current account surplus indicative 
of “imbalances”? The current account surplus may 
have been indicative of “imbalances”, but does not 
provide sufﬁ  ciently granular information to make an 
effective assessment. The emergence of unsustainable 
imbalances seems to be better and more clearly 
captured through other indicators such as large jumps 
in asset prices and the rapid expansion in corporate 
sector debt (Charts 4 and 5). Japan’s continuously large 
current account surplus itself did not provide clear 
hints with regard to the bubbles that turned out to be 
the root cause of serious damage to economic stability. 
Third, how does exchange rate policy inﬂ  uence the 
overall economy? An excessive focus on preventing 
the appreciation of the currency and on easing the 
negative effects of exchange rate appreciation fostered 
expectations that a low interest rate environment would 
continue. This became one of the factors that led to the 
emergence of the bubble, thereby impairing the stability 
of the economy. The accommodative monetary policy 
following the Louvre Accord, reﬂ  ected the external 
pressure to reduce the current account surplus as well 
as domestic concerns about the negative impact of the 
appreciation of the yen on the Japanese economy.
2| T HE RECENT GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
In the run up to the recent global ﬁ  nancial crisis 
in the mid-2000s, concerns were raised that a 
disorderly adjustment would occur through a sharp 
fall in the value of the dollar and a jump in long-term 
Chart 5
Japan’s corporate sector debt 
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Sources: Bank of Japan, “Flow of Funds”; Cabinet Ofﬁ  ce, “National Accounts”.
Chart 4
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US interest rates. Such a view focused on the widening 
US current account deﬁ  cit and the large increase 
in foreign exchange reserves in emerging market 
countries, and the possibility that such countries 
may at some point become reluctant to continue 
ﬁ  nancing the US deﬁ  cit. However, as we all know, 
what came to pass was quite different. At the outset 
of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, as market participants became 
extremely risk averse, a global flight-to-quality 
occurred. US long-term rates fell substantially as 
demand for US Treasuries increased, and the dollar 
strengthened against most other currencies. 
This experience, similar to the Japanese experience, 
also highlights the need to look beyond current 
account balances and identify what constitutes 
underlying imbalances. Then the question becomes 
“How can we identify the imbalances or distortions 
which could lead to unsustainable global imbalances? 
What type of information do we need to focus our 
attention on which is not sufﬁ  ciently captured in 
current account data?”. Taking into account the 
additional experiences from the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, I would like to point out two areas where 
attention should be focused. 
2|1  Build-up of excess leverage 
First, the build-up of excess leverage in the economy. 
When we look at long-term trends in ratio-to-GDP 
of the savings and investment balance which is 
equivalent to the current account balance (Chart 6), 
one can notice that the net negative savings in the 
United States widens in the 2000s. These changes in 
themselves do not tell us whether such changes are 
sustainable or not. However, when we additionally 
examine the developments in household debt, we 
can see large deviations from longer-term trends 
(Chart 7). Such developments are similar to the 
Japanese situation in the 1980s, only the sector where 
excess leverage materialised is different. In Japan, 
the build-up was in the corporate sector (Chart 5). 
Certainly, large deviations from longer-term trends 
in themselves are not deﬁ  nitive, but are a strong 
indication that unsustainable ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
are likely to be accumulating. What is important 
is to have both an economy-wide assessment and 
assessment at a somewhat more disaggregated level, 
for example at the sector level. This would enable 
policymakers to obtain a better sense of where 
imbalances may be accumulating.
It is also important to understand the mechanism 
of how credit, which supports the build-up of 
leverage, is provided. Before the current crisis, 
special investment vehicles (SIVs) set up by US 
and European banks frequently purchased various 
structured products originated by the sponsoring 
bank. Once the subprime loan market collapsed, 
the credit and liquidity risks of the SIVs ended up 
with the sponsoring institutions, as reputational risks 
forced them to extend support. A similar situation 
had evolved in Japan during its bubble period in the 
late 1980s. Non-bank ﬁ  nancial companies were used 
aggressively to expand residential and commercial 
Chart 7
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Source: Federal Reserve, “Flow of Funds Accounts”.
Chart 6
Investment-savings balance of the United States
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “National Income and Product Account”.
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real estate lending often to circumvent regulatory 
limits, especially after regulators introduced 
overall limits on bank lending growth to these 
sectors. Although such non-bank companies were 
structured so that they were not consolidated on to 
banks’ balance sheets, most of the losses ended up 
with the parent banks. Both the recent US and 
Japanese experience highlight the need to look 
beyond the banking system. The shadow banking 
system played a key role in both countries.
2|2  Gross capital ﬂ  ows and risk proﬁ  le 
  of ﬁ  nancial institutions
Second, gross capital ﬂ  ows. The net capital ﬂ  ows 
corresponding to current account balances do not 
provide us with sufﬁ  cient information to locate 
possible sources of unsustainable imbalances. It will 
need to be supplemented with other sources of data. 
A case in point would be recent developments in 
the euro area. The current account of the euro area 
has been generally balanced during the past decade. 
But BIS banking statistics show that euro area banks 
actively intermediated US dollar funds from the 
international banking system to the non-banking 
sector in the United States (Chart 8). Although the 
netted amount was small, the accumulation of risks 
such as maturity mismatches, currency mismatches 
and credit risks, which increased on a gross basis 
was substantial.
Chart 8
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Globally, banks, especially European banks, had been 
borrowing short-term dollar funds in the interbank 
market and investing in long-term assets. The dollar 
funding risk in the international banking system 
had been rapidly increasing in the mid-2000s, becoming 
substantially larger than the funding risk for other 
major currencies (Chart 9). As the crisis unfolded, 
counterparty credit concerns increased in global 
ﬁ  nancial markets and banks began to hoard dollar 
liquidity. The US dollar interbank funding market 
froze up and many market participants struggled to 
obtain dollars. Serious tension continued in the ﬁ  nancial 
markets until central banks including the Bank of Japan 
began to provide US dollars through bi-lateral swap lines 
arranged with the US Federal Reserve. 
BIS banking statistics and other sources of information 
help us ﬁ  ll the gaps in the current account data. 
There was a large inﬂ  ow of funds from banks in 
advanced European countries before the crisis, which 
were rapidly withdrawn after the summer of 2007 
(Chart 10). BIS reporting banks’ overall cross-border 
Chart 10
Cross-border ﬂ  ows through the international banking system
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of the ﬂ  ow.
Source: BIS, “International Locational Banking Statistics”.
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exposures to the Unites States have fallen more than 
20% since reaching its peak in ﬁ  rst quarter of 2008, 
and especially exposures to the private sector, which 
include investments in structured products, have 
fallen nearly 30% (Chart 11).  
By obtaining micro-level information on ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, central banks and other supervisory and 
regulatory authorities can assess the true risk proﬁ  le 
of individual institutions. It also provides the basis 
for grasping the distribution of risks at various levels 
of aggregation, including at the overall macro-level. 
It will be important to develop a macro-level 
understanding of where risks are concentrated in the 
ﬁ  nancial system as well as the possible interlinkages 
among market participants.
3| A SSESSING GLOBAL IMBALANCES
Current account balances provide us with helpful 
information on the state of the economy. At the 
same time, the current crisis as well as other past 
experience show the potential risks of simply 
using current account balances as an indicator of 
unsustainable global imbalances. Although not an 
exhaustive list, I would like to highlight three points 
as lessons from current and past experiences.
First, surpluses and deﬁ  cits emerge as a result of the 
voluntary choices of economic entities and thus should 
not be automatically deemed as problematic. Trends 
in current account surpluses and deﬁ  cits are the 
reﬂ  ection of longer-term trends in savings-investment 
activities which are strongly inﬂ  uenced by economic 
developments and demographics. Current account 
surpluses and deﬁ  cits will only lead to problems 
when they become unsustainable, and thus a careful 
overall assessment is required.
Second, distinguishing between the structural and 
cyclical components of the current account balance 
is often a difﬁ  cult task. Trying to adjust the structural 
component through macroeconomic policy and 
exchange rate policy entails the risk of causing the 
development of ﬁ  nancial imbalances which may 
destabilise the economy. A narrow policy focus on 
current accounts per se can be counter-productive.
Third, central banks and other authorities need 
to assess the possible emergence of unsustainable 
imbalances using a wide range of indicators such 
as asset prices, leverage, gross capital ﬂ  ows and 
information on risk pricing and risk proﬁ  les of 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. Current account data only 
provide us with a partial picture. In the past, 
when the cross-border ﬂ  ow of goods and services 
dominated interrelationship among economies, 
assessing current account and trade balances would 
give us a relatively good picture of emerging external 
imbalances. But the size of global capital ﬂ  ows has 
dramatically increased and the speed with which 
capital moves to and from one country to another has 
accelerated as well. The growing use of derivatives 
adds another layer of complexity. The approach 
for assessing global imbalances needs to change 
accordingly. 
4|  PREPARING FOR NEW TYPES 
OF CRISES
Mankind has continuously searched for “monetary 
anchors” or “monetary benchmarks”. This endeavor 
has been a repetition of initial success followed by 
failure or outdatedness as a result of rapid changes in 
the economic and ﬁ  nancial system. In the realm of 
monetary policy, money supply targeting was often 
used in the 1970s in many advanced economies. 
However, with rapid financial innovation, its 
relationship with inﬂ  ation developments became 
unstable and was eventually abandoned. Inﬂ  ation 
targeting emerged as a new monetary policy 
framework in the 1990s, but the challenges in its 
effective implementation have surfaced as bubbles 
developed in the run-up to the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, especially in identifying imbalances when they 
appear in forms other than inﬂ  ation of goods and 
services. With regard to the international monetary 
system, we have moved in the past from the gold 
standard to managed ﬂ  oating exchange rate systems. 
Currently, the major currencies are free ﬂ  oating, but 
many countries still have ﬁ  xed or managed ﬂ  oating 
regimes. Current account imbalances can be one 
of many possible indicators. But there is no single 
indicator which can identify emerging imbalances, let 
alone unsustainable global imbalances. A sufﬁ  ciently 
ﬂ  exible policy framework which can adapt to rapidly 
changing economic and financial conditions is 
required. The process through which crises unfold 
is unique for each crisis. We must learn from past 
experience, but strategies for the last war do not 
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assure success in future battles. Keeping an open 
mind is important.  
As policymakers work to develop a framework for 
identifying and dealing with unsustainable global 
imbalances in a rapidly evolving economic and 
ﬁ  nancial environment, they need to be cognizant 
of three key elements: two longer-term trends and 
one element unique to the current environment.  
First, though needless to say, we are experiencing 
a further acceleration in economic and ﬁ  nancial 
globalisation. In addition, due to technological 
advances, the interlinkages between financial 
markets and among market participants are becoming 
increasingly complex. Shocks in one part of the world 
will swiftly spillover to other parts and often through 
unexpected channels. The effects of the risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy can be larger and 
more widespread than in the past. Search-for-yield 
behaviour by global investors is one such example.
Second, the share of emerging market countries in 
the world economy is increasing. Their share in the 
world economy which was 20% in 1990 and 2000 has 
increased to 31% in 2009 on a current price basis, 
and they are expected to account for seven-tenths of 
global economic growth in 2010. Emerging economies 
have become the drivers of global growth, and 
consequently their responsibilities as members of 
the global community have increased. For example, 
it needs to be recognised that the implications 
of inflexible exchange rates in major emerging 
economies on the global economy have become 
larger. The perspective of an orderly structural 
adjustment process for domestic industries may 
warrant a gradual shift from ﬁ  xed exchange rates to 
a more ﬂ  exible exchange rate system and a controlled 
appreciation of the home currency. But, at the same 
time, policymakers in emerging economies need 
to recognise that such a policy both hampers the 
ﬂ  exible implementation of domestic macroeconomic 
policies including monetary policy, and exports the 
cost of the adjustment to other countries. If other 
countries follow and take similar measures to delay 
the appreciation of their currencies, the impact 
on economies which allow ﬂ  exible exchange rate 
movements could be magniﬁ  ed.
Third, we are now in the unique situation where 
some advanced economies are recovering from 
the aftermath of the bursting of the bubble, and 
as a result, the world is facing an uneven pace of 
recovery. On the one hand, emerging economies 
Chart 12





















Note: Total of the following 30 countries (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Viet Nam, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Iceland, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Africa, and 
Saudi Arabia). Until 2005, data for Saudi Arabia are not included. Charts are semi-annual basis.
Source: CEIC.
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are continuing their robust growth. On the other 
hand, due in part to the balance-sheet adjustment 
process following the bursting of the bubble in 
some countries, recovery in advanced economies 
is slow. Central banks in advanced economies have 
introduced unconventional measures to implement 
extremely accommodative monetary policy. 
As advanced economies face the zero lower bound 
in interest rates and a weak transmission mechanism 
constrained by balance-sheet adjustment needs, 
monetary easing through the traditional interest 
rate or credit channel is not working to the extent 
normally expected. Instead, in an integrated global 
ﬁ  nancial system and with the divergent pace of 
economic growth, capital is rapidly ﬂ  owing into high 
growth emerging economies which do not face such 
constraints (Chart 12). The risk-taking channel is 
working more effectively at the global level.
Since the emerging economies are not hampered 
by the aftereffects of the bursting of the bubble, the 
stimulative effects of such capital inﬂ  ows could be 
unexpectedly large. With short-term interest rates 
at very low levels in advanced economies, carry 
trade activity has picked up and correlation among 
emerging economy equity markets as well as between 
emerging equity markets and commodity markets 
is rising (Chart 13). If such capital ﬂ  ows lead to the 
development of bubbles and abrupt reversals in the 
future, the negative repercussions would not only 
be harmful for emerging economies, but also for the 
global economy. 
5|  CHALLENGES FOR POLICYMAKERS
In order to prevent the emergence of unsustainable 
global imbalances, policymakers need to dig down 
beyond changes in the current account balance to 
capture underlying imbalances. A key sea change that 
we are witnessing is that through rapid globalisation 
the identification of harmful imbalances and 
implementing rebalancing measures can no longer 
be a purely domestic process. 
In formulating macroeconomic policy, the traditional 
emphasis was to ensure domestic stability or to put 
one’s house in order. However, with the deepening 
of globalisation, the simple sum of each country’s 
policy action may not necessarily achieve an optimal 
outcome at the global level. Policymakers in both 
advanced and emerging economies need to rethink 
the meaning of domestic stability. The direct impact 
Chart 13
Correlations among emerging market equity and commodity indexes
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Note: Correlations are derived from the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) index of each region and S&P GSCI (Goldman Sachs Commodity Index). 
Each point shows the level of correlations of daily returns from the last 500 trading days. Latest date are as of November 30, 2010.
Source: Bloomberg.
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of policy measures on the domestic economy does 
not provide a comprehensive view. It has become 
ever more important to review the spillover effects 
of their policies across borders which will also 
reverberate back to each country through economic 
and ﬁ  nancial interlinkages.
When considering possible ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
stemming from large capital inﬂ  ows or inﬂ  exible 
exchange rate regimes, there are no easy solutions 
which would satisfy each and every country’s needs 
both from an economic and political standpoint. 
But since we are all in the same boat, if we all 
start rowing in different directions, the risks of a 
fallacy of composition would increase. There are 
no mechanical or automatic mechanisms which can 
guide our economic policies. The complexity of how 
the current crisis unfolded across ﬁ  nancial markets 
and economies as well as the new difﬁ  culties that 
continue to emerge as the global economy moves 
through the gradual recovery phase, are reconﬁ  rming 
this point. For policymakers, humbly learning 
from each other’s experiences and deliberate and 
constructive dialogue, though perhaps not fancy 
solutions, are essential, as our boat continues through 
uncharted waters.
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